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BANKRUPTCY: COUNTING PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY
CORPORATIONS AS SEPARATE CREDITORS UNDER
SECTION 59(b) OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
UNDER Section 59 (b) of the Bankruptcy Act1 a debtor who is amenable
to involuntary bankruptcy2 and has twelve or more creditors with
"provable claims liquidated as to amount and not contingent as to lia-
bility ... which amount in the aggregate in excess of the value of
securities held by them, if any, to $500 or over"' 3 may be adjudicated
bankrupt upon the petition of three or more of these creditors. Whether
a corporate creditor and its wholly owned and controlled subsidiary to
which the parent has in good faith made a partial assignment of claims
against the debtor may both qualify as petitioning creditors under the
statute depends on the extent to which the entity of the subsidiary should
be recognized.
In the recent case of In the Matter of Gibraltor Amusements, Ltd.,4
the Wurlitzer Company had received several notes of the debtor Gibral-
tor Amusements, a purchaser of jukeboxes from Wurlitzer. Two of
these notes had been assigned to Wurlitzer Acceptance Corporation
(WAC), a subsidiary corporation established for the primary purpose
of financing the sales of Wurlitzer. The parent company was the
sole stockholder of the subsidiary, and the two corporations had sub-
stantially the same officers and directors, including identical presidents.5
However, the corporate form was strictly followed and the corporate
entity of WAC had been recognized for credit and tax purposes. More-
over, the good faith of the assignment was demonstrated by WAC's
purchase of Gibraltor's notes for valid consideration long before the
filing of the bankruptcy petition.6 There was no evidence of a fraudu-
'Bankruptcy Act § 5 9 (b), ch. 541, 30 Stat. S61 (1898), as amended, ii U.S.C.
§ 9 5 (b) (1958) [hereinafter cited Bankruptcy Act].
"'Any natural person, except a wage earner or farmer, and any moneyed, business,
or commercial corporation, except a building and loan association, a municipal, rail-
road, insurance, or banking corporation, owing debts to the amount of $S,ooo or over,
may be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt upon default or an impartial trial and shall
be subject to the provisions and entitled to the benefits of this title." Bankruptcy Act § 4.
"Bankruptcy Act § 5 9 (b).
'291 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 196i), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 925 (196i). The facts set
forth are taken from the opinion unless otherwise cited.
5 Brief for Wurlitzer Company and Wurlitzer Acceptance Corporation, pp. 45a-46a,
In the Matter of Gibraltor Amusements, Ltd., 291 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1961).
'WAC had fully complied with General Order 5(2), which requires that "Peti-
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lent attempt to subvert the Bankruptcy Act at the time of the
assignment.
Gibraltor was adjudicated bankrupt by the referee after Wurlitzer
filed an amended involuntary petition in bankruptcy against Gibraltor
in which WAC and two individual creditors joined. On review by the
bankruptcy court the adjudication was affirmed, despite the court's dis-
qualification of one of the individual filing creditors as a petitioner.7
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, a majority
of the court, pointing to the definition of "creditor" in the Bankruptcy
Act as being "all encompassing," felt that neither the policy nor the
language of the Bankruptcy Act made the instant case one in which
the separate corporate personality of the subsidiary should be disre-
garded." While no indicia of fraud or attempted subterfuge of the
Bankruptcy Act were present in the Gibraltor case, Judge Friendly
contended in dissent that to recognize the separate corporate personality
of WAC under the existing facts would be offensive to the policy of
the Bankruptcy Act.'
The purpose of section 59(b) can be ascertained from the history
of the several bankruptcy acts.10 The early acts permitted a single
creditor to initiate an involuntary proceeding if the creditor's claim met
the prescribed statutory minimum.11 However, because of the social
tioners in involuntary proceedings for adjudication, whose claims rest upon assignment
or transfer from other persons, shall annex to one of the triplicate petitions all instru-
ments of assignment or transfer, and an affidavit setting forth the true consideration
paid for the assignment or transfer of such claims and stating that the petitioners are
the bona fide holders and legal and beneficial owners thereof and whether or not they
were purchased for the purpose of instituting bankruptcy proceedings." General Order
5(2), 11 U.S.C. appendix, p. xSia (z958).
General Order 5(a) was designed to avoid colorable trafficking of claims among
friendly parties in order to create sufficient petitioning creditors and to advise the courts
of the circumstances surrounding the transfer. Reed v. Thornton, 43 F.2d 813, 814
( 9 th Cir. 1930) ; accord, In re Kehoe, 233 Fed. 415, 417 (2d Cir. 1916). Whether
the purpose for which the claim was purchased affects the status of the petitioning
creditor is for the bankruptcy court to determine. See 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTcY I 59.05,
at 564. n-30 (1 4 th ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER).
' In the Matter of Gibraltor Amusements, Ltd., 187 F. Supp. 931 (E.D.N.Y. ,96o).
a g F.ad at 24-25.
'Id. at 28.
"Whether a subsidiary with assigned claims can qualify in the absence of fraud as
a creditor under § 5 9 (b) is not expressly answered in the Bankruptcy Act or in prior
decisions. Therefore, it is necessary to look to the legislative journals to see what
provisions Congress would probably have made had they envisioned such a question.
See J. W. Ould Co. v. Davis, 246 Fed. z28 ( 4th Cir. 1917); 1 COLLIER § '(a), At S
(1 3 th ed. 1923). Annot., 7o A.L.R. 5 (193r).
!'The first national bankruptcy act, enacted in a Soo, provided for involuntary
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stigma and financial embarrassment associated with bankruptcy, it came
to be felt that an insolvent debtor should not be thrown into bank-
ruptcy unless more than one creditor wished to press his claim. 2 Under
an 1874 amendment, therefore, one-fourth of the total number of
creditors having claims totaling one-third of all provable claims against
the debtor were necessary to file an involuntary bankruptcy petition. s
Neither the lax provisions of the early acts nor the stringent amendment
of 1874 accomplished the Congressional desire to provide creditors with
an adequate means of satisfying their claims while protecting debtors
from undue harassment.'4 Thus, when the Bankruptcy Act of I898
was passed' Congress tempered the extremities of the earlier acts by
requiring three creditors to initiate an involuntary petition where the
debtor has more than twelve creditors qualified to file a petition.
When there are more than twelve qualified creditors, "counting
to three" is a primary concern of the courts in the application of Section
59(b) of the Bankruptcy Act. Since the assigmnent or splitting of
claims would provide a means of circumventing the intent of the statu-
tory provision,' courts have refused to include claims of a transferee
proceedings either by a single creditor with a claim of $x,ooo, any two creditors with
claims totaling $s,5oo, or any three creditors with claims totaling $3,000. Bankruptcy
Act ch. 19, § 2, 2 Stat. i9 (i8oo) I see generally 2 COLLIER § 59 (13th ed. 1923).
Dissatisfaction with the working of the act brought repeal in t803. Repeal of Bank-
ruptcy Act of i8oo, ch. 6, z Stat. 248 (1803) ; see I COLLIER 0.04, at 7-
The next bankruptcy act, enacted in 1841, allowed one creditor with a claim of
$5oo or more to file an involuntary bankruptcy petition. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 5, 5 Stat.
440 (1841). This act was repealed in 1843. An Act to Repeal the Bankruptcy Act,
Ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614 (1843).
The third bankruptcy act, enacted in 1867, allowed a claim to be filed by one or
more creditors whose claims totaled an aggregate of $25o. Bankruptcy Act ch. 176,
§ 39, 14 Stat. 517 (1867).
1 3 COLLIER I 59.o, at 548; see In re Kehoe, 233 Fed. 415 (2d Cir. 1916); 31
CONG. REc. 1851 (1898) (remarks of Representative Sparkman of Florida); H.R.
Rep. No. 6S, 5 5 th Cong., ±d Sess. 35 (1897); see generally 31 CONG. REC. 1777-938
(z898). The Panic of 1873 resulted in a large number of business failures. The
many impatiently initiated involuntary bankruptcy proceedings during that period were
primarily responsible for the tide of emotion against involuntary bankruptcy. See i
HANNA & MACLACHLAN, CREDITORS' RIGHT 261 (4 th ed. 1949).
"'Bankruptcy Act § 39, as amended, ch. 390, t8 Stat. 178 (1874).
1& 3 COLLIER I 59.01, at 548.
1 Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898). The Bankruptcy Act of 1867,
as amended in 1874, had been repealed in 1878. An Act to Repeal the Bankrupt Law,
ch. 16o, zo Stat. 99 (1878). See 3 COLLIER 59.o, at 548.
16 See Emerine v. Tarault, 219 Fed. 68 (6th Cir. 19x5); Stroheim v. Lewis F.
Perry & Whitney Co., 175 Fed. 52 (ist Cir 1go) S Leighton v. Kennedy, 129 Fed.
737 (ist Cir. 19o4) ; In re Burlington "Malting Co., 1o9 Fed. 777 (E.D. Wis. 190");
In re Woodford, 30 Fed. Cas. 492 (No. 17,972) (N.D. Ohio 1876).
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if the assignment was made solely to create additional creditors.17 Other-
wise, one creditor could transfer portions of his claim to assignees
willing to join in bankruptcy proceedings, thereby causing one claim
to be counted several times.18
Though courts are reluctant to disregard the separate legal entity
of a corporation, 9 it is submitted that the historical development of
section 59 (b) requires the denial of separate creditor status to a sub-
sidiary corporation on the facts present in the Gibraltor case. While
unity of ownership and management are usually not in themselves
suflicient grounds for denying recognition of separate corporate per-
sonalities,20 it would seem that, as Judge Friendly pointed out, the
purpose of section 59(b) is to prevent a debtor with twelve or more
creditors from being adjudicated bankrupt on less than three distinct
decisions.21  When a decision to file an involuntary petition of bank-
' See In re Tribelhorn, 137 Fed. 3 (2d Cir. 19o5); In re H.E. Page Motor Car
Co., 2S Fed. 318 (D.C. Mass. 1918) ; 3 COLLIER 59.05, at 558; cf. In re Glory
Bottling Co., 278 Fed. 6z (E.D.N.Y. 19z), rec.d on other grounds 283 Fed. x1o
(.d Cir. 9zz) (mere fact claim based on trade acceptance did not invalidate involun-
tary petition). But see In re Bevins, x65 Fed. 434. (ad Cir. 1908) (claims purchased
for nominal amount with specific purpose of making up required statutory number held
valid). Even the majority of the court in the instant case felt that the decision in
Bevins was "overly liberal." 291 F.2d at 25.
"' A creditor should not obtain a benefit that Congress sought to deny him. In re
Independent Thread Co., 113 Fed. 998 (D.C.N.J. x9oz) accord, In re Tribelhorn,
supra note r7; In re Halsey Electric Generator Co., 163 Fed. I18 (D.C.N.J. 19o8),
appeal dismissed sub nom. Hogg v. Halsey Electric Generator Co., 169 Fed. iozx (3d
Cir. i9o9).
" See, e.g., Rapid Transit Subway Constr. Co. v. City of New York, 259 N.Y.
472, x8z N.E. x45 (932); Oceanic Insul-Lite Corp. v. Sullivan Dry Dock & Repair
Corp., 191 Misc. 354, 77 N.Y.S.zd 498 (1947).
The "corporate veil" is pierced most often when the facts demonstrate that the
corporation is merely the alter ego or business conduit of its governing or dominating
personality. See generally LAITY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS § 47
(1936). The corporate entity is also not recognized where the equities will not war-
rant recognition, or where recognition will defeat public convenience. United States
v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 Fed. 247 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1905); accord,
Shamrock Oil & Gas Co. v. Ethridge, z59 F. Supp. 693 (D. Colo. 1958). See gen-
erally i O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPoRATIONS § x.o, at 21 (1958).
20 i FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 43, at 157 (rev. perm. ed. t931),
21 291 F.2d at 28. Judge Friendly also noted that although there was no fraudu-
lent purpose to subvert the Bankruptcy Act when the claims were placed with WAC,
the parent might have been attempting to insure its ability to initiate involuntary bank-
ruptcy "by the simple expedient of organizing two financing subsidiaries . . . and
seeing to it that claims against each debtor are parceled out in advance of bankruptcy."
Ibid. Bankruptcy may, however, have been the furthest thing from the mind of Wur-
litzer when the claims were placed. Id. at n.6.
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ruptcy is made for two or more corporations by a single individual or
managerial unit, in reality there is but one decision. Because the cor-
porate entity should not be used as a device to defeat legislative policy,22
that decision should be counted only once.
One of the stronger arguments for the Second Circuit's recognition
of WAC's claim as a separate creditor is the absence of an express
statutory provision specifying when the corporate entity should be dis-
regarded under section 59(b),2 especially in light of section 59(e)'s
exclusion of certain classes of creditors for purposes of "counting to
three. 24 It might be contended that the enumeration of these specific
exclusions serves to negate the disqualification of other creditors. How-
ever, the purpose of section 59(e) is to exclude those creditors who
would be prone to oppose an involuntary petition because of a con-
sanguineous or friendly relationship with or domination by the debtor.
That section does not purport to concern itself with creditors who
should be excluded because of intra-creditor relationships such as that
existing between a corporation and its subsidiary.
In the absence of a provision pertaining to the exclusion of related
corporate entities, it would seem proper to seek guidance from the
history of past and present bankruptcy legislation. That history proves
that the purpose of section 59(b) is to require three distinct decisions as
to whether an involuntary petition should be filed. No other inference
can be extracted from the whole of the Bankruptcy Act.
2 2 See HENN, CORPIOIRAONS § 1sx, at ±14 (1961).
The majority pointed out that while "Congress has repeatedly added to and
amended the Federal taxing law to deal with the problems [of] . . . multiple cor-
poration[s] . . . it has not seen fit similarly to tinker with the Bankruptcy Act." 291
F.zd at z.
Comstock v. Group of Investors, 335 U.S. 211 (1948), relied on by the court, 291
F.zd at 25, allowed a parent corporation to recover from its subsidiary in corporate
reorganization proceedings, thereby recognizing the separate personality of both corpora-
tions. However, Comttock arose in a completely different context from the instant
case. The relationship between the companies was that of debtor-creditor 3 it was not
an intra-creditor relationship as was present in the Gibraltor case.
" Those creditors that shall not be counted are "(z) such creditors as were em-
ployed by the bankrupt at the time of the filing of the petition; (2) creditors who are
relatives of the bankrupt or, if the bankrupt is a corporation, creditors who are stock-
holders or members, officers or members of the board of directors or trustees or other
similar controlling bodies of such bankrupt corporation; (3) creditors who have par-
ticipated, directly or indirectly, in the act of bankruptcy charged in the petition;
(4) secured creditors whose claims are fully secured; and (S) creditors who have
received preferences, liens, or transfers void or voidable under the tile." Bankruptcy
Act § 59(e).
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